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The effect of Islamic values on voluntary corporate governance disclosure: The case of Saudi 
listed firms 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – The study examines the effect of Islamic values on the extent of voluntary corporate 
governance (CG) disclosure. In addition, we investigate the effect of traditional ownership structure and 
CG mechanisms on the extent of voluntary CG disclosure. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – We distinctively construct Islamic values and voluntary CG disclosure 
indices using a sample of 75 Saudi listed firms over a seven-year period in conducting multivariate 
regressions of the effect of Islamic values on the extent of voluntary CG disclosure. Our analyses are 
robust to controlling for firm-level characteristics, fixed-effects, endogeneities and alternative measures. 
 
Findings – We find that corporations that depict greater commitment towards incorporating Islamic 
values into their operations through high Islamic values disclosure index score engage in higher voluntary 
CG disclosures than those that are not. Additionally, we find that audit firm size, board size, government 
ownership, institutional ownership and the presence of a CG committee are positively associated with the 
level of voluntary CG disclosure, whilst block ownership is negatively associated with the extent of 
voluntary CG disclosure. 
 
Practical implications – Our study has clear practical implications for future research, practice and 
broader society by demonstrating empirically that corporations that voluntarily incorporate Islamic values 
into their operations are more likely to be transparent about their CG practices, and thereby providing new 
crucial insights on the effect of Islamic values on voluntary CG compliance and disclosure. 
 
Originality – To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical attempt at explicitly examining the 
effect of Islamic values on the extent of voluntary CG disclosure. We also offer evidence on the effect of 
traditional CG and ownership structures on the extent of voluntary CG disclosure. 
 
 Keywords: Islamic values, corporate governance, Ownership structure, Voluntary disclosure, Saudi 
Arabia 
 
Paper type: Research paper 
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1. Introduction 
 The collapse of major public corporations, such as Barings Bank, Enron, and WorldCom in the 
developed economies, such as UK and US in the 1990s/2000s, which were attributed primarily to poor 
corporate governance (CG) practices (Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012b, 2015a, b), 
generally highlighted the need for good CG practices (MacNeil and Li, 2006; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012). 
Similarly, global interest in CG was further heightened by the 1997/1998 Asian economic crisis, which 
demonstrated that macro-economic problems could be exacerbated by systematic CG failures in 
developing countries (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a)[1]. Consequently, CG codes and 
policy reforms have been pursued in a considerable number of countries (Conyon and Mallin, 1997; 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Generally, such reforms seek to enhance the way in which public 
corporations are governed by encouraging greater board accountability, discipline, fairness, independence, 
responsibility, transparency and disclosure (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009; Samaha et al., 2012). 
Observably, and despite apparent differences in corporate settings, such CG codes, including 
those that have been issued in most developing countries do not only follow the 1992 UK-style voluntary 
compliance regime, but also are primarily focused narrowly on enhancing shareholder-related protections 
(Conyon, 1994; Ntim et al., 2012a; Albassam et al., 2015). However, the capacity of CG codes to achieve 
good governance depends on the extent to which companies are willing to engage in effective voluntary 
compliance and disclosure (Core, 2001; Collett and Hrasky, 2005). Therefore, this study seeks to 
investigate whether Islamic values can explain discernible differences in the extent of voluntary CG 
disclosures by Saudi listed firms. Specifically, we seek to ascertain whether corporate commitment to 
voluntarily/explicitly embrace and incorporate Islamic values into business operations, along with 
traditional ownership structure and CG mechanisms can explain observable differences in the levels of 
voluntary CG disclosures.  
Our decision to investigate the relationship between Islamic values and the extent of voluntary CG 
disclosure in Saudi Arabia is motivated by the following factors. First, and similar to a number of 
Islamic/Arabic countries, but distinct from most developed and developing countries is that governance of 
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public corporations is strongly influenced by Islamic values that emanate mainly from ‘Shariah’ (Islamic 
law) (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006; Safieddine, 2009; Judge, 2010). ‘Shariah’ is inherently holistic in 
orientation, providing comprehensive guidance for practicing Muslims in every reasonably conceivable 
aspect of day-to-day life, including business, law, economics, environment, politics, religion, and society 
(Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Kamla, 2009)[2]. Consequently, trade, commerce, business and financial 
transactions are expected to generally reflect Islamic principles. For example, ‘Shariah’ prohibits ex-ante 
charging/offering of interest (riba) on loans and deposits, uniquely requiring banks to instead engage in 
‘mudarabah’ (profit-sharing) and ‘musharakah’ (joint-venture) forms of Islamic banking/financing that 
often necessitates the appointment of ‘Shariah’ compliant supervisory boards (Lewis, 2005; Chong and 
Liu, 2009)[3]. The governance implication is that the distinctiveness of these Islamic corporate/financing 
forms also creates unique CG challenges, and thus requires separate examination (Lewis, 2005; Safieddine, 
2009). For instance and in theory, ‘mudarabah’ does not only increases adverse selection, moral hazard 
and monitoring costs of borrowers (Choudhury and Hoque, 2006; Chong and Liu, 2009), but also 
exacerbates agency problems by increasing opportunities for managerial expropriation of corporate assets 
(Safieddine, 2009; Vinnicombe, 2010).   
Second, as explained by Albassam (2014), globally, Saudi Arabia is one of the important 
economies. More specifically, Saudi GDP represents 25% of the total Arab GDP in 2010 (SFG, 2009; 
Hearn et al., 2011). As important ‘G-20’ country, the Saudi economy has experienced extensive neo-
liberal economic reforms and as such, has attracted significant foreign investments. Moreover, the Saudi 
government makes significant investments in both developed and developing countries (Al-Filali and 
Gallarotti, 2012). For example, foreign investments in Saudi Arabia was estimated to be around $170bn 
(USD) in 2011 in the fields of energy, petrochemicals and finance, which are spread in over 50 countries 
around the world (Alriyadh, 2011), including in the US, Europe and Asia (MOF, 2011). Therefore, any 
CG failures will arguably have major negative implications for the global economy.  
Third, and despite the relative uniqueness of the Saudi context and the voluntary nature of the 
Saudi code, there is a paucity of empirical studies examining the code’s effectiveness in improving CG 
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standards in Saudi public corporations (Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010; Alshehri and Solomon, 2012). 
However, there are a limited number of prior studies on Saudi that need to be explicitly acknowledged.  A 
group of past studies (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004; Alsaeed, 2006) have investigated how firm-specific 
characteristics influence voluntary disclosure in Saudi and generally report that larger firms tend to 
voluntarily disclose more information in their annual reports than their smaller counterparts. Another 
group of prior Saudi studies (Safieddine, 2009; Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010; Soliman, 2012a, b) have 
examined the association between CG structures and financial performance with their findings suggesting 
that, on average, better-governed corporations tend to generate higher performance than their poorly-
governed counterparts. A third group of prior Saudi studies, such as Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008), 
Alshehri and Solomon (2012), Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012), Piesse et al. (2012) and Albassam et al. 
(2015), have examined CG practices. For example, Hussainey and Al-Nodel (2008) examine the extent to 
which 64 Saudi listed corporations report information about their CG practices on their websites between 
October 2005 and January 2006. They report that the level of online reporting of CG differs between 
industries with banking firms disclosing more information on their CG practices than firms in other 
industries. Similarly, using 45 Saudi listed corporations from 2006 to 2007, Al-Moataz and Hussainey 
(2012) investigate the connection between CG mechanisms and the level of information disclosed on 9 
CG practices. Their results suggest that board independence, audit committee size, liquidity, gearing and 
profitability are the main determinants of CG disclosure in Saudi listed corporations. By contrast, both 
Alshehri and Solomon (2012), and Piesse et al. (2012) use questionnaires and interviews to explore 
stakeholders’ perceptions of CG practices in Saudi, and report that there is a strong stakeholder support for 
the introduction of the Saudi CG code, whereas shareholder activism is weak. In a recent study, Albassam 
et al. (2015) report significant association between ownership and board characteristics on voluntary 
disclosure of CG practices using a sample of 80 Saudi listed firms from 2004 to 2010. Observably, 
Albasam et al. (2015) do not study the effect of Islamic values on voluntary CG disclosure.    
The current study, therefore, differs from existing ones in a number of ways. First, while our study 
investigates how Islamic values drive the extent to which Saudi listed firms voluntarily comply with and 
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disclose CG provisions contained in the 2006 Saudi code. Existing studies mainly: (i) examine the 
determinants of general voluntary disclosures (Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2004; Alsaeed, 2006); and (ii) 
investigate the effect CG mechanisms on performance (Al-Nodel and Hussainey, 2010; Soliman, 2012a, 
b), which are differently focused. Second, and apart from differences in focus, the samples used by 
existing related studies (Hussainey and Al-Nodel, 2008; Al-Moataz and Hussainey, 2012) are noticeably 
smaller in comparison to the size of the current sample, as well as investigate a limited number of CG 
provisions. Arguably, this impairs the generalisation of their findings for Saudi listed firms. Finally, our 
study investigates a large set of CG disclosures (65 provisions) using the constructed CG index by 
Albassam (2014) over a very recent and longer period (2004-2010) compared with the periods 
investigated by existing studies and thus, the current examination can also be considered as an extension 
to prior studies.     
Given this background, the main objective of this paper is to examine the extent to which 
corporate commitment to incorporate Islamic values in their operations, as well as conventional ownership 
structure and CG mechanisms influence the level of information that Saudi listed firms disclose on their 
CG practices. First and to the best of our knowledge, we provide for the first time empirical evidence on 
the extent and level to which Islamic values are voluntarily embraced and incorporated into corporate 
operations by constructing a broad disclosure index containing 10 Islamic values using a sample of 75 
Saudi listed corporations from 2004 to 2010. Second, we provide for the first (to the best of our 
knowledge) time evidence on the extent to which Islamic values drive the level of voluntary compliance 
and disclosure of good CG practices among Saudi listed corporations[4]. Third, we provide evidence on 
the effect of traditional ownership and CG mechanisms on the extent voluntary CG disclosure. This can 
improve our understanding of the main factors that influence the level of voluntary compliance and 
disclosure of CG practices in a major developing Islamic/Arabic country in which various stakeholders, 
such as the Saudi government, the Saudi Capital Market Authority (CMA) and the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul) take a keen interest in CG and stakeholder issues.  
 7 
 
 
 Our findings are two-fold. First, our analysis of the factors influencing voluntary CG compliance 
and disclosure suggests that Islamic values are generally significant in explaining variations in voluntary 
CG disclosures. Specifically, we find that corporations that depict greater commitment towards 
incorporating Islamic values into their operations through high Islamic values score engage in higher CG 
disclosures than those that are not. Second, we find that audit firm size, board size, government ownership, 
institutional ownership and the presence of a CG committee are positively associated with the level of 
voluntary CG disclosure, whilst block ownership is negatively associated with the extent of voluntary CG 
disclosure. Our analyses are robust to controlling for firm-level characteristics, fixed-effects, 
endogeneities and alternative measures. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The following sections review the prior literature 
and hypotheses development, present the research design and methodology, and report data and empirical 
results, whilst the final section concludes the study. 
 
  
2. Prior literature and hypothesis development  
 Existing CG studies have focused mainly on: (i) general voluntary disclosures (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Barako et. al., 2006; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; 
Rouf, 2011; Taylor et al., 2011; Ntim et al., 2015c); (ii) CSR disclosures (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b; 
Soobaroyen and Ntim, 2013; Ntim, 2015a); (iii) performance (Ntim, 2012; Ntim, 2015b; Ntim et al., 
2015a, b); (iv) risk disclosure (Ntim et al., 2013); and (v) voluntary CG disclosures (Collett and Hrasky, 
2005; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a; Albassam et al., 2015). 
However, studies examining the effect of Islamic values on the extent of voluntary CG disclosure are rare 
and therefore, offer opportunities to contribute to the extant literature by investigating the effect of Islamic 
values on the extent of voluntary disclosure. Thus, we draw from these strands extant literature and the 
Saudi CG reforms to develop our central hypothesis relating to the effect of Islamic values on voluntary 
disclosure of CG practices. Mainly, the study examines the extent to which Islamic values are voluntarily 
embraced and incorporated into business operations, as measured by a broad Islamic values disclosure 
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index affect voluntary disclosure of CG practices. We also examine the effect of traditional ownership 
(block ownership, government ownership and institutional ownership) and CG (audit firm size, board size 
and the presence of a CG committee) on the extent of voluntary disclosure. However, as these traditional 
ownership and CG variables have been examined in the prior literature (e.g., Collett and Hrasky, 2005; 
Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a, b), we do not develop specific 
hypotheses for each of them, but they are included in the regression analyses and discussed as part of our 
findings. 
  
2.1. Islamic values, transparency and voluntary CG disclosure  
 As previously noted, ‘Shariah’ is holistic in orientation providing guidance for every aspect of 
practicing Muslims day-to-day life activities (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Vinnicombe, 2010). Thus, and in 
effect, ‘Shariah’ acknowledges that practicing Muslims will inevitably have to engage in secular/material 
transactions, but specifies that such dealings must be guided by religious/spiritual/Islamic values of 
accountability, equity, fairness, morality, responsibility and social justice (Kamla, 2009; Maali and Napier, 
2010). In the context of modern large ‘Islamic public corporations’, a major way of ensuring that business 
transactions are ‘Shariah’ compliant are: (i) providing independent reports to shareholders as to the 
compliance of management with Islamic business principles/values; and (ii) auditing corporate accounts to 
verify accurate payments of the Islamic religious tax (zakah) and using Islamic loans (Lewis, 2005). 
However, and to be effective in monitoring and advising managers, the company must depict 
accountability, independence, confidentiality, competence, consistency and disclosure (Lewis, 2005; Grais 
and Pellegrini, 2006). In this context and although in Islam, accountability, for example, is first and 
foremost to God (Allah), it nonetheless explicitly requires corporations to make true, fair, timely and 
transparent disclosure of financial facts and information not only to shareholders, but also to other 
stakeholders (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Sarker, 2012). Thus, ‘Islamic corporations’ are arguably subject to 
greater monitoring and scrutiny than their non-Islamic counterparts[5]. Therefore, and from an agency 
theoretical perspective, corporations that voluntarily embrace and incorporate Islamic values into business 
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operations signal their intention to commit to good governance standards. One way by which ‘Islamic 
corporations’ can display their good governance qualities is to engage in greater transparency and 
disclosure with respect to their CG practices. 
 Empirical studies that examine the extent to which Islamic values are incorporated into business 
operations and voluntary disclosure of CG practices are rare, and thus provide opportunities to contribute 
to the literature. The only exception is a study by Vinnicombe (2010). Using 15 Islamic banks in Bahrain 
from 2004 to 2007, she measures the level of compliance with accounting and governance standards 
issued by the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). She 
reports that compliance with AAOIFI’s disclosure guidelines regarding SSBs and ‘murabahah’ contracts 
are high, but low with respect to AAOIFI’s disclosure requirements on the ‘zakah’ and ‘mudarabah’ 
contracts.  With specific reference to the Saudi context, and given that the decision to incorporate Islamic 
principles into business operations is a voluntary one, our expectation is that ‘Islamic public corporations’ 
are more likely to commit to good governance, including engaging in increased disclosure of their CG 
practices. Thus, our central or main hypothesis that we test in this study is that:     
H1:  There is a statistically significant positive association between Islamic values disclosure  
 index and the level of voluntary compliance and disclosure of good CG practices.  
 
 
 
3. Research Design and Methodology 
 As it has been explained previously, the study aims to examine the effect of Islamic values on the 
extent of voluntary CG disclosure. The index is developed by using different CG provisions. Specifically, 
to examine our main hypothesis (H1), we employ a binary [6] Saudi CG disclosure index (GINDX), as our 
main dependent variable. The index has been constructed to measure the four main disclosure areas 
contained in the 2006 Saudi CG code. In particular, the index is divided into areas as: (i) board of director 
(BDIR); (ii) disclosure and transparency (DTRA); (iii) internal control and risk management (INCR); and 
(iv) shareholders’ right (SHAR). This index has been constructed by Albassam (2014). For brevity, the 
detailed provisions are presented in Appendix 2 of Albassam (2014, pp.341-348). 
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Insert Table I about here 
 Second, and to test our main hypothesis (H1), our main independent variable is a binary Islamic 
values disclosure index (IVDI), containing 10 Islamic values covering broad areas of Islamic business and 
financial principles. The detailed provisions are contained in the Appendix. The IVDI seeks to measure the 
extent to which Saudi listed firms voluntarily and explicitly incorporate Islamic values into their business 
operations. These provisions were selected based on extensive examination of the prior literature that 
explores CG from an Islamic perspective (Rahman, 1998; Lewis, 2005; Choudhury and Hoque, 2006; 
Grais and Pellegrini, 2006; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Safieddine, 2009; Vinnicombe, 2010; Sarker, 2012) and 
the annual reports of the sampled Saudi listed firms.  
 Third, and since several studies suggest that ownership and board structure variables can affect 
disclosure (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, 2005; Ntim et al., 2012b), we collect data on ownership structure, 
including block ownership (BLON), government ownership (GVTR), and institutional ownership (INON) 
and board/CG characteristics, including board size (BODZ), audit firm size (AUFZ), and the presence of a 
CG committee (CORG) and include in our models as control variables. Finally, and to control for potential 
firm-level omitted variables bias (Gujarati, 2003; Petersen, 2009), number of firms’ characteristics were 
included as control variables. These include risk (BETA), return on assets (PROF), sales growth (SAGR), 
leverage (LEVG), firm size (FIMZ), capital expenditure (CEXP), dividend payment status (DVPS), 
industry dummies (IDUM), and year dummies (YDUM). These variables are chosen, particularly, because 
a number of theoretical and empirical studies suggest that these variables can affect the extent of voluntary 
CG disclosure (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Rouf, 2011; 
Hooghiemstra, 2012; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012; Samaha et al., 2012; 
Fifka, 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a, b; Albassam et al., 2015).   
Thus, the main equation to be estimated is presented as follows: 
          


n
i
ititi
n
i
iti
n
i
itiitit CONTROLSOWNCGIVDIGINDX
111
10                      (1) 
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where variables are defined as follows: Saudi corporate governance disclosure index (GINDX); Islamic 
values disclosure index (IVDI); CG refers to board size (BODZ); audit firm size (AUFZ); and the presence 
of a CG committee (CORG); OWN refers to block ownership (BLON); institutional ownership (INON); 
and government ownership (GVTR), whereas CONTROLS refers to all the control variables, including 
dividend payment status (DVPS), sales growth (SAGR), capital expenditure (CEXP), leverage (LEVG), 
firm size (FIMZ), profitability (PROF), risk (BETA), 8 industry dummies (IDUM), and 7 year dummies 
(YDUM). 
 
4. Data and empirical results  
4.1. Data 
The study mainly focused on Saudi firms those are listed in the stock market. The Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Tadawul) has 145 firms listed at the end of 2010. Thus, the study basically targeted all 
corporations listed on the Tadawul. After excluding corporations that had been suspended, merged, newly 
listed and with no/missing data, the complete data needed is obtained for a total of 75 corporations for 
seven firm-years (525 firm observations). These firms follow 8 different industries; include services 12 
firms, building and construction 11 firms, financial 11 firms, agriculture 9 firms, petrochemical 8 firms, 
manufacturing 10 firms, cement 8 firms and others 6 firms. The firms’ annual reports and firm stock 
information have to be available for all seven years. This helps to overcome any problems that may be 
caused by unobserved firm-level heterogeneity (Henry, 2008). 
The study mainly focused on collecting data from the two main sources: (i) the firms’ annual 
reports in order to obtain the voluntary disclosure, Islamic values and ownership structure; (ii) the firms’ 
financial statements as well as the Tadawul to collect financial data, particularly financial and accounting 
information. The sample used data from 2004 to 2010 for two reasons (i) the Saudi corporate governance 
code issued in 2006. Thus, this helps to examine pre- and post-2006 issuance of the Saudi CG code as a 
part of sensitivity analysis; and (ii) following the previous literature (Barako et al, 2006; Henry, 2008), 
this sample helps to fulfil the requirement of a balanced panel dataset in which both time series and cross-
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sectional observations are included to minimise multi-collinearity and provide more degrees of freedom 
among the variables (Gujarati, 2003; Ntimet al., 2012a). 
4.2 Empirical Findings 
4.2.1 Descriptive statistics summary  
 Table II presents the summary descriptive statistics relating to the level of compliance with the 
GINDX and IVDI. First, the analyses suggest that there is substantial degree of dispersion in the 
distribution of both indices. For example, the GINDX (IVDI) ranges from a minimum of 1.54% (9.09%) to 
a maximum of 92.31% (86.36%) with the average corporation complying with 45.94% (29.01%) of the 65 
(10) CG (Islamic values) provisions investigated.  Second, and in line with the findings of previous studies 
(Patel et al., 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012a; Albassam et al., 2015), the results 
in Table II suggest that compliance with the GINDX (IVDI) provisions generally improves over time, with 
the median aggregate compliance levels increasing from 18.46% (22.73%) in 2004 to 76.92% (31.82%) in 
2010.  
Insert Table II about here 
 On the other hand, the descriptive statistics for the other explanatory and control variables are 
shown in Table III. Similar to the GINDX and IVDI, the distribution of all the variables generally display 
wide variations. For example, BODZ ranges from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 12 with a median of 8 
board members. In line with the findings of past studies (Alsaeed, 2006; Piesse et al., 2012; Soliman, 
2012a, b; Albassam et al., 2015), BLON is between 5.00% and 85.21% with a mean of 33.99%. The 
figures for AUFZ, CORG, GVTR, and INON, as well as the control variables in Table III suggest 
substantial variation in our sample, and thus reducing any possibilities of sample selection bias.  
Insert Table III about here 
4.2.2 OLS and multivariate analyses 
In this study, the OLS technique has been used to examine the influence of Islamic value on good 
CG practices. To make sure that there is no serious violation of OLS assumptions and it can be applied in 
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this study, a number of OLS assumptions such as multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, 
homoscedasticity and linearity are examined. To test for possible multicollinearities, Table IV presents the 
correlation matrix of all the variables employed in this study. The direction and magnitude of both test’s 
the Spearman’s non-parametric and Pearson’s parametric coefficients are almost similar which shows that 
there is no serious non-normalities in the data. Further, both of the matrices suggest that there is no serious 
problem of multicollinearity as the correlations among all the variables used in the analysis is fairly low.  
Insert Table IV about here 
As shown in Table IV the relationship between the GINDX, IVDI and the explanatory variables, 
and also between the GINDX and the control variables is statistically significant. More specifically, IVDI, 
AUFZ, BODZ, CORG, GVTR, and INON are statistically significant and positively associated with the 
GINDX, whereas BLON is statistically significant and negatively related to the GINDX. With reference to 
the control variables, the findings suggest that larger, highly geared, and dividend paying corporations 
make significantly more voluntary CG disclosures, whereas capital intensive, growing and risky 
corporations make significantly less voluntary CG disclosures. There is, however, no evidence to suggest 
that profitable Saudi corporations make significantly less or more voluntary CG disclosures. 
 Table V reports the findings of the OLS analysis of the effect of Islamic values, ownership 
structure and board characteristics on the extent of voluntary disclosure of CG practices. Column 2 reports 
the results of a pooled OLS regression of the GINDX on the independent and control variables. Our 
findings generally suggest that the independent variables are significant in explaining cross-sectional 
variations in voluntary CG disclosures.  
Insert Table V about here 
 First, the results suggest that the coefficients on IVDI, statistically significant and positively 
related to GINDX, implying that Saudi corporations with high IVDI, generally make significantly more 
voluntary CG disclosures. The positive connection between IVDI and GINDX is consistent with 
theoretical suggestions that corporations that voluntarily incorporating Islamic values into their operations 
subject themselves to greater managerial monitoring and scrutiny (Choudhury and Hoque, 2006; Grais and 
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Pellegrini, 2006) and as such, they are more likely to have better CG and disclosure standards. In fact, and 
apart from being independent, competent and consistent in executing its functions (Rahman, 1998; Lewis, 
2005; Sarker, 2012), commitment to espouse Islamic values will be associated with the expectation 
making true, fair and transparent disclosures not only to shareholders, but also to other stakeholders (Abu-
Tapanjeh, 2009; Safieddine, 2009; Vinnicombe, 2010). Observably, our results also offer empirical 
support for our main hypothesis (H1) and thus provide new empirical insights on the link between Islamic 
values and the extent of voluntary disclosure with particular focus on the disclosure of CG practices. 
Second, to explore the link between each of the voluntary CG disclosure mechanisms, the main 
equation of the study is re-estimated by substituting GINDX with the right of shareholders’ rights (SHAR), 
board of directors (BDIR), internal control and risk management (INCR), and disclosure and transparency 
(DTRA) sub-indices. The outcomes of the equations are reported in the Columns 3 to 6 of Table V, 
respectively, with the results remaining essentially as those reported for the main GINDX.  Third and 
although treated as control variables (not the main focus of this study), the findings from Table V suggest 
that audit firm size, board size, government ownership, institutional ownership and the presence of a CG 
committee are positively associated with the level of voluntary CG disclosure, whilst block ownership is 
negatively associated with the extent of voluntary CG disclosure, and thereby extending the findings of 
prior studies that were specifically conducted within the Saudi corporate context, such as Hussainey and 
Al-Nodel (2008), Alshehri and Solomon (2012), Al-Moataz and Hussainey (2012), Piesse et al. (2012) 
and Albassam et al. (2015), which reported similar results. 
Finally, the results of the control variables are also presented in the Table V and are largely 
similar to the expectations of the study.  For instance, the LEVG, DVPS and FIMZ are statistically 
significant and positively related to the GINDX, while the BETA is statistically significant and negatively 
associated with the GINDX. On the other hand, the SAGR, CEXP and PROF are not generally statistically 
significant.  
 
4.2.3. Robustness analyses 
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In this section, the authors conduct extra tests to examine the sensitivity of their results. First, as 
explained above, the Saudi CG code was first issued in 2006. However, our sample time-frame starts from 
2004 to 2010. Thus, the sample was divided into two groups: Pre- and Post-2006 to check whether there 
are variations in our findings in terms of the period of investigation. As shown in Table VI, the findings 
are essentially the same. Specifically, the statistical significance of the results between samples (Pre- and 
Post-2006) indicates that the publication of the 2006 Saudi CG Code have led to observable improvement 
in CG practices among firms, and hence, a decrease in the cross-sectional differences in the Post-2006 CG 
ratings. 
Second, and as discussed above, the adopted GINDX is un-weighted. However, the number of CG 
rules employed differs across the four categories, leading to different weights being allocated to each 
category: BDIR (54%); DTRA (25%); INCR (9%); and SHAR (12%). Therefore, to check whether our 
findings are insensitive to the weighting of the four categories, each category in the GINDX is allocated 
equal weight of 25%, as a weighted GINDX. Although there are minor differences with regard to the 
magnitude of the coefficients, our findings presented in Table VI are largely similar to those reported in 
Table V, and hence the central tenor of our findings is the same. 
Insert Table VI about here 
 Finally, and as has been discussed in Albassam (2014), the voluntary CG disclosure behaviour 
may be jointly and dynamically influenced by unobserved company-specific hetereogeneities (Henry, 
2008; Ntim et al., 2012b), which simple OLS regression may fail to ascertain (Gujarati, 2003; Petersen, 
2009). Thus, given the panel nature of our dataset, we estimate a fixed-effects model to account for the 
potential unobserved company-specific characteristic. This involves re-running equation (1), with the 
inclusion of 74 dummies to represent the 75 sampled firms. As shown in Table VI, the fixed-effects 
findings are essentially the same as before, indicating that our results are robust to potential unobserved 
company-specific feature.  
 
5. Conclusion 
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 Saudi Arabia has pursued close to a decade of corporate governance (CG) reforms in the form of 
the 2006 Saudi CG Code. However, in a strong conservative Islamic country, such as Saudi Arabia, it can 
be argued that compliance with CG standards is equivalent to applying a number of Islamic values (Abu-
Tapanjeh, 2009). Specifically, the wealth of individuals and companies are expected to be consistent with 
the broader expectations of stakeholders and society (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). Specifically, the context of 
Saudi business is formally influenced by Islamic values, such as prohibition of “riba” or “usury”. In 
addition, there is increasing trend of companies using different forms of Islamic finance, such as 
“Musharakah” and “Murabaha”. Moreover, there are professionals (Shariah scholars), whose primary role 
is to assess whether a company’s transactions are compliant with Islamic values or not. Thus, Islamic 
values can be expected to play a key role in Saudi businesses’ and corporations’ decision-making, 
including voluntary CG disclosure ones. 
 Consequently, this study examines the effect of voluntarily complying with Islamic values by 
Saudi corporations on the extent of voluntary CG practices and disclosures. Specifically, it sought to 
explore whether a voluntary commitment by public corporations to incorporate Islamic values in their 
operations can improve corporate disclosure and transparency with a specific focus on the compliance and 
disclosure of voluntary CG practices. In doing so, the main independent variable is a binary Islamic values 
disclosure index (IVDI), containing 10 Islamic values; whereas the Saudi CG disclosure index (GINDX) is 
used as a dependent variable. The study used a sample consisting 75 Saudi listed companies over a seven-
year period (525 firm observations).  
We find that corporations that depict greater commitment towards incorporating Islamic values 
into their operations through high Islamic values disclosure index score engage in higher voluntary CG 
disclosures than those that are not. Additionally, we find that audit firm size, board size, government 
ownership, institutional ownership and the presence of a CG committee are positively associated with the 
level of voluntary CG disclosure, whilst block ownership is negatively associated with the extent of 
voluntary CG disclosure. Our analyses are robust to controlling for firm-level characteristics, fixed-effects, 
endogeneities and alternative measures. It was noticeable from the data that there are other important 
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provisions that may affect the practice of CG. Also, the study adopted un-weighted Islamic index; 
therefore, it did not take into account the variation in the level of importance among the different 
provisions. Finally, our study has clear practical implications for future research, practice and broader 
society by showing that corporations that voluntarily incorporate Islamic values into their operations are 
more likely to be transparent about their CG practices, and thereby providing new crucial insights on 
Islamic values and their impact on CG compliance and disclosure.   
 Notes 
1. It should be noted that the recent (2007 to 2009) global financial crisis that has resulted in the collapse and/or 
government bailouts of major public corporations, such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, Lloyds TSB 
and Royal Bank of Scotland has further re-ignited the debate regarding the effectiveness of CG mechanisms in resolving 
agency problems associated with excessive risk-taking, executive pay and incentives, transparency and disclosure in 
public corporations worldwide (Guidry and Patten, 2012; Hrasky, 2012; Ntim et al., 2015b). 
2. Noticeably, such guidance is explicitly underpinned by positive values/principles of accountability, equality, fairness, 
generosity, morality, justice, philanthropy, social responsibility, transparency, and truthfulness (Rahman, 1998; Sarker, 
2012). By contrast, negative practices, such as exploitation, profiteering, and gambling, are strongly prohibited (Lewis, 
2005; Choudhury and Hoque, 2006). 
3. Although there are slight differences in these Islamic corporate/financing forms, the central tenet is mutual profit-and-
loss sharing (PLS) underpinned by Islamic values that require business dealings and transactions to be ethical, fair, just 
and moral (Dekmejian, 1994; Chong and Liu, 2009). For example, ‘musharakah’ contracts operate primarily like joint-
ventures in which a bank and an entrepreneur make joint contributions of capital and management expertise to a 
business project. Any profit and loss emanating from the project is shared in a pre-determined ratio (Archer et al., 1998; 
Chong and Liu, 2009). By contrast, ‘mudarabah’ contracts are profit-sharing agreements, in which the whole capital 
required to finance a project is provided by a bank, whilst the borrower provides the managerial expertise and labour. 
Any profit from the project is shared by both parties in a pre-determined ratio, but any losses are borne solely by the 
bank (Karim, 2001; Chong and Liu, 2009). Further, and although most theoretical forms of Islamic banking/financing 
are modeled around the ‘musharakah’ and/or ‘mudarabah’ concepts of PLS (Archer et al., 2010; Boytsun et al., 2011), 
there are other financing forms that ‘Shariah’ does not prohibit, but may not be necessarily PLS in nature, such as 
‘murabaha’ (cost plus), ‘ijarah’ (leasing), ‘bai muajjal’ (deferred payment sale), ‘bai salam’ (forward sale), and ‘istisna’ 
(contract manufacturing) (see Chong amd Liu, 2009, p.129 for a detailed overview of these Islamic financing forms). 
4. We note that although a considerable number of past studies have explored accounting, CG and disclosure from an 
Islamic perspective ((Rahman, 1998; Lewis, 2005; Choudhury and Hoque, 2006; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009; Kamla, 2009; 
Kamla and Roberts, 2010; Sarker, 2012), most of these studies have been largely descriptive/normative (Rahman, 1998; 
Lewis, 2005; Choudhury and Hoque, 2006; Grais and Pellegrini, 2006; Sarker, 2012) and/or critical (Abu-Tapanjeh, 
2009; Kamla, 2009) in nature, resulting in acute lack of studies that provide empirical insights  on the extent to which 
Islamic values might influence voluntary disclosure in general, but CG disclosure in particular (Safieddine, 2009; 
Vinnicombe, 2010). 
5. The need for closer monitoring and scrutiny is also consistent with the distinctive nature of Islamic banking/financing, 
such as ‘mudarabah’, which does not only result in greater adverse selection and moral hazard problems, but also 
exacerbates agency conflicts by increasing avenues by which opportunistic managers can expropriate corporate 
resources (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006; Safieddine, 2009). Thus, greater pressure can be expected to be applied especially 
by the SSB on managers to engage in increased corporate disclosures, including those relating to CG practices. 
6. Even though binary scoring scheme may fail to capture the relative importance of the various CG provisions (Unerman, 
2000; Beattie et al., 2004; Barako et al., 2006), we adopt it for a number of reasons. First, there is a general lack of a 
rigorously developed theoretical framework on which weights could be correctly assigned to different CG provisions, 
and thus using dichotomous scoring scheme obviates a situation whereby our disclosure indices are excessively 
dominated by a particular set of CG provisions (Botosan, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Second, the findings of past 
studies suggest that the use of weighted and un-weighted indices tend to give similar results (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; 
Barako et al., 2006). Fourth, binary scoring scheme is less subjective and easy to replicate (Henry, 2008; Ntim et al., 
2012a, b). Finally, using a binary scheme to score disclosures in annual reports is supported by a rigorously established 
theoretical and empirical literature (Botosan, 1997; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Meek et al., 1995; Collett and Hrasky, 
2005; Alsaeed, 2006; Tsamenyi et al., 2007; Vinnicombe, 2010; Rouf, 2011; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012). 
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Appendix  
Full list of the Islamic values disclosure index provisions based on ‘Shariah’ principles 
    Islamic values disclosure index (IVDI) 
IVDI theme/type IVDI item: information on or reference to 
Range of 
scores 
Total score 
per them 
 1. Whether a ‘Shariah’ supervisory board/committee has been 
established. 
0-1 
10 
2. Whether the firm provides explicit/formal statement regarding its 
willingness to voluntarily apply/incorporate Islamic values into 
business operations and/or investment transactions. 
0-1 
3. Whether a narrative regarding the fact that the firm’s funds and 
loans are on the basis of interest-free (riba) is disclosed. 
0-1 
4. Whether the firm discloses any Islamic and conventional finance 
separately on its financial accounts. 
0-1 
5. Whether firm’s directors provide a clear narrative as to whether 
the firms’ transactions are consistent with Islamic law. 
0-1 
6. Whether a narrative regarding the appropriate calculation and 
payment of the Islamic religious tax (zakat) for the financial year 
is disclosed. 
0-1 
7. Whether there is a due amount of Zakat for previous years. 0-1 
8. Whether the firm is classified as ‘Nagi’ (i.e., the firm’s business 
transactions and/or investments are ‘Shariah’ compliant) by 
Shariah scholars. 
0-1 
9. Whether a narrative regarding the existence of a ‘Shariah’ review 
and monitoring unit that implements the Islamic values is 
disclosed. 
0-1 
10. Whether the firm has a code of ethics. 0-1 
Total 10 IVDI items  10 
Scoring procedure    
0:   If a particular Islamic value/principle item is not disclosed  
1:   If a particular Islamic value/principle item is disclosed 
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Table I 
Summary definition of variables 
Dependent variables 
  GINDX Saudi corporate governance index constructed by Albassam (2014) (see Appendix 2, pages 
341 to 348). It takes a value of 1 if each of the 65 CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
  BDIR Sub-index of GINDX related to the board of directors consisting of 35 provisions. It takes a 
value of 1 if each of the 35 CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
  DTRA Sub-index of GINDX related to disclosure and transparency consisting of 14 provisions. It 
takes a value of 1 if each of the 16 CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
  INCR Sub-index of GINDX related to internal control and risk management consisting of 6 
provisions. It takes a value of 1 if each of the 6 CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
  SHAR Sub-index of GINDX related to right of shareholders and General Assembly consisting of 8 
provisions. It takes a value of 1 if each of the 8 CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise. 
Independent variable 
  IVDI Islamic values (IV) voluntary compliance and disclosure index (IVDI) consisting of 10 
provisions that takes a value of 1 if each of the 10 IV provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; 
scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. 
 
Other explanatory variables 
  AUFZ 1, if a firm is audited by a big-four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touché, 
Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
  BLON Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total company 
shareholdings. 
  BODZ Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of a company. 
  CORG 1, if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise. 
  GVTR Percentage of government ownership to total company ordinary shareholdings 
  INON Percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders. 
Control variables: Firm-level characteristics 
  CEXP Percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets. 
  DVPS 1, if a firm paid dividends during the financial year, 0 otherwise. 
  FIMZ Natural log of the book value of a firm’s total assets. 
  IDUM Dummies for each of the 8 main industries: banks and financial; services; building and 
construction; agriculture; petrochemical; industrials/manufacturing; cement; and others.   
  LEVG Percentage of total debt to total assets. 
  BETA Standard deviation of the PROF variable. 
  PROF Percentage of operating profit to total assets. 
  SAGR Percentage of current year’s sales minus previous year’s sales to previous year’s sales. 
  YDUM Dummies for each of the seven years from 2004 to 2010 inclusive. 
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Table II 
Summary descriptive statistics of levels of compliance with IVDI and GINDX (%) 
 All 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Panel A: Levels of compliance with Islamic values disclosure index (IVDI)  
Mean 29.01 24.61 25.58 27.88 28.36 31.76 31.88 33.03 
Median 27.27 22.73 22.73 22.73 22.73 27.27 27.27 31.82 
STD 11.68 8.65 9.18 11.68 12.37 13.15 11.35 12.26 
Min 9.09 9.09 13.64 13.64 13.64 18.18 18.18 18.18 
Max 86.36 54.55 63.64 81.82 86.36 86.36 81.82 86.36 
Panel B: Levels of compliance with corporate governance disclosure index (GINDX) and sub-indices  
All provisions contained in the Saudi corporate governance index (GINDX)    
Mean 45.94 17.75 22.44 35.44 46.83 56.69 66.75 75.67 
Median 47.69 18.46 23.08 38.46 47.69 55.38 67.69 76.92 
STD 22.86 4.98 7.23 12.17 14.16 12.15 11.06 8.61 
Min 1.54 1.54 6.15 4.61 9.23 16.92 40.00 49.23 
Max 92.31 29.23 38.46 63.08 84.61 89.23 92.31 92.31 
Board of directors (BDIR) 
Mean 39.57 8.63 11.53 26.94 38.90 49.84 64.47 76.71 
Median 37.14 8.57 11.43 31.43 37.14 40.00 65.71 77.14 
STD 28.22 5.60 8.36 16.89 18.62 18.64 17.79 13.40 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.71 34.29 37.14 
Max 100.00 25.71 31.43 65.71 82.86 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Disclosure and transparency (DTRA) 
Mean 55.25 21.92 29.58 44.08 60.50 71.83 76.83 82.00 
Median 56.25 18.75 31.25 43.75 62.50 75.00 75.00 81.25 
STD 25.49 9.10 13.64 15.68 17.89 11.69 11.57 8.47 
Min 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.25 43.75 43.75 56.25 
Max 100.00 50.00 62.50 81.25 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Internal control and risk management (INCR)  
Mean 26.22 1.78 8.00 13.56 24.22 35.33 45.56 55.11 
Median 16.67 0.00 0.00 16.67 16.67 33.33 50.00 50.00 
STD 25.06 5.18 12.66 14.68 19.04 19.37 20.93 21.22 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.67 
Max 100.00 16.67 50.00 50.00 66.67 83.33 100.00 100.00 
Rights of shareholders and the general assembly (SHAR) 
Mean 69.14 60.17 65.33 70.67 70.17 71.50 72.17 74.00 
Median 75.00 62.50 62.50 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 75.00 
STD 13.25 19.35 15.73 10.17 9.39 11.17 8.86 9.36 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 37.50 12.50 50.00 37.50 
Max 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 87.50 
Notes: This Table reports descriptive statistics of the aggregate levels of compliance with both Islamic values disclosure index 
(IVDI) and Saudi corporate governance index (GINDX) from 2004 to 2010. Panel A of the table reports descriptive statistics on the 
levels of compliance with the IVDI, whilst Panel B contains descriptive statistics on the levels of compliance with the GINDX and 
sub-indices. 
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Table III 
Summary descriptive statistics of the other explanatory and control variables for all (525) firm years 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Other explanatory variables 
  AUFZ% 56.00 100.00 50.00 0.00 100.00 
  BLON% 33.99 30.17 25.09 5.00 85.21 
  BODZ 8.32 8.00 1.71 4.00 12.00 
  CORG% 10.00 0.00 30.20 0.00 100.00 
  GVTR% 12.96 3.05 20.15 0.00 83.69 
  INON% 5.68 0.00 10.94 0.00 40.00 
Control variables 
  CEXP% 59.30 0.84 153.46 00.00 82.00 
  DVPS% 63.00 100.00 48.00 0.00 100.00 
  FIMZ 14.05 13.97 1.60 10.42 18.93 
  LEVG% 22.33 8.31 27.99 0.00 86.00 
  BETA 1.70 1.14 1.91 0.00 15.94 
  PROF% 6.53 4.55 7.64 -8.00 26.75 
  SAGR% 15.58 9.30 35.44 -46.05 140.00 
Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Audit firm size (AUFZ); block ownership (BLON); board size (BODZ); presence of a 
corporate governance committee (CORG); government ownership (GVTR); institutional ownership (INON); capital expenditure 
(CEXP); dividend payment status (DVPS); firm size (FIMZ); leverage (LEVG); risk (BETA); return on assets (PROF); and sales 
growth (SAGR). Table I fully defines all the variables used. 
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        Table IV 
        Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices of all variables for all (525) firm year 
Variable GIDX IVDI AUFZ BLON BODZ CORG GVTR INON CEXP DVPS FIMZ BETA LEVG PROF SAGR 
GINDX  .435*** .195*** -.119*** .142*** .333*** .128*** .196*** -.090** .094** .215*** -.065* .142*** -.008 -.183*** 
IVDI  .376***  -.095** -.028 .125*** .169*** -.079* .040 -.091** -.002 .044 -.064 -.037 -.097** -.114*** 
AUFZ .190*** .008  .511*** .274*** .069 .324*** .279*** .044 .209*** .507*** .008 .411*** .119*** .087** 
BLON -.109** .040 .497***  .341*** .056 .629*** .333*** .034 .420*** .682*** -.039 .386*** .282*** .096** 
BODZ .118*** .193*** .274*** .324***  .105** .334*** .173*** -.032 .246*** .553*** -.175*** .231*** .101** .007 
CORG .336*** .248*** .114* .131* .103**  .091** -.0015 -.028 -.008 .104** .110** .038 -.021 -.074 
GVTR .181*** -.140*** .253*** .618*** .148*** .031  .001 .011 .477*** .684*** -.068 .184*** .272*** -.007 
INON .187*** .037 .307*** .355*** .138*** -.018 -.089**  -.017 .083* .220*** -.189*** .282*** -.123** .033 
CEXP -.075* -.112*** .013 -.027 -.010 -.040 -.032 .005  .060 -.023 -.077* -.041 .036 .101** 
DVPS .087** -.035 .209*** .409*** .254*** -.008 .347*** .089** .045  .491*** -.090** .015 .532*** .039 
FIMZ .206*** .096** .497*** .689*** .492*** .106** .605*** .228*** -.057 .486***  -.115*** .462*** .274*** .101** 
BETA -.074* -.083* -.005 .015 -.155*** .154*** .035 -.139*** .022 -.030 -.049  -.093* .153*** .003 
LEVG .111** .199*** .451*** .433*** .338*** .014 .109** .491*** -.081* .058 .539*** -.141***  -.102** .109** 
PROF -.020 -.109** .116*** .273*** .107** -.041 .231*** -.146*** .050 .481*** .256*** -.187*** -.187**  .195*** 
SAGR -.131*** -.025 .061 .034 .001 -.118*** -.049 .044 .096** -.023 .045 .076 .065 .104**  
Notes: The bottom left half of the table contains Person’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. ***, **, 
and * indicate that correlation is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: The Saudi corporate governance disclosure index (GINDX); Islamic values 
disclosure index (IVDI); audit firm size (AUFZ); block ownership (BLON); board size (BODZ); presence of a corporate governance committee (CORG); government ownership (GVTR); institutional 
ownership (INON); capital expenditure (CEXP); dividend payment status (DVPS); firm size (FIMZ); risk (BETA); leverage (LEVG); return on assets (PROF); and sales growth (SAGR). Table I fully 
defines all the variables used.  
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Table V 
The effect of Islamic values on the extent of voluntary disclosure of good corporate governance practices 
 Model GINDX main-index BDIR sub-index DTRA sub-index INCR sub-index SHAR sub-index. 
 Independent variable Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values 
 Islamic values disclosure  index: 
   IVDI 0.186 (.000)*** 0.135 (.000)*** 0.149 (.000)*** 0.096 (.040)** 0.128 (.000)*** 
Control variables: Ownership structure variables: 
   BLON -0.118 (.026)** -0.110 (.049)** -0.105 (.058)* -0.010 (.745) -0.113 (.034)** 
   GVTR 0.164 (.000)*** 0.189 (.000)*** 0.146 (.000)*** 0.109 (.010)*** 0.155 (.000)*** 
   INON 0.125 (.000)*** 0.018 (.654) 0.073 (.055)* 0.064 (.067)* 0.104 (.050)** 
Control variables: Corporate governance variables: 
   BODZ 0.123 (.014)** 0.105 (.086)* 0.012 (.869) 0.110 (.019)** 0.120 (.015)** 
   AUFZ 0.134 (.000)*** 0.128 (.000)*** 0.116 (.000)*** 0.124 (.000)*** 0.011 (.739) 
   CORG 0.296 (.000)*** 0.187 (.000)***  0.165 (.000)*** 0.249 (.000)*** 0.178 (.000)*** 
Control variables: Firm-level characteristics 
   CEXP -0.048 (.186) -0.039 (.195) -0.070 (.064)* -0.020 (.267) -0.040 (.190) 
   DVPS 0.149 (.000)*** 0.130 (.000)*** 0.124 (.000)*** 0.116 (.000)*** 0.137 (.000)*** 
   FIMZ 0.284 (.000)*** 0.265 (.000)*** 0.243 (.000)*** 0.228 (.000)*** 0.254 (.000)*** 
   RISK -0.106 (.045)** -0.093 (.054)* -0.085 (.066)* -0.072 (.089)* -0.090 (.058)* 
   LEVG 0.175 (.000)*** 0.160 (.000)*** 0.153 (.000)*** 0.176 (.000)*** 0.150 (.000)*** 
   PROF -0.018 (.740) -0.011 (.798)   -0.008 (.832) -0.003 (.874) -0.009 (.810) 
   SAGR -0.032 (.259) -0.025 (.296) -0.020 (.330) -0.015 (.440) -0.022 (.329) 
   Industry dummies           Included Included Included Included Included 
   Year dummies           Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant -0.659 (.000)*** -0.570 (.000)*** -0.468 (.000)*** -0.440 (.000)*** -0.614 (.000)*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics             1.950 1.746 1.685 1.643 1.860 
F- value            16.820***   14.965***   13.683***   12.862***   15.297*** 
Adjusted R2             0.498 0.462 0.456 0.440 0.475 
No. of observations              525   525   525    525   525 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard Errors technique. ***, **, and * denote 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Saudi corporate governance disclosure index (GINDX); board and directors sub-index 
(BDIR); disclosure and transparency sub-index (DTRA); internal control and risk management sub-index (INCR); rights of shareholders and the general assembly sub-index (SHAR); 
Islamic values disclosure index (IVDI); block ownership (BLON); government ownership (GVTR); institutional ownership (INON); board size (BODZ); audit firm size (AUFZ); 
presence of a corporate governance committee (CORG); capital expenditure (CEXP); dividend payment status (DVPS); firm size (FIMZ); risk (BETA); leverage (LEVG); return on 
assets (PROF); and sales growth (SAGR). Table I fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table VI 
Robustness analyses of the effects of Islamic values on the extent of voluntary disclosure of good corporate governance practices 
 Model Pre-2006 GINDX Post-2006 GINDX Weighted-GINDX  Fixed-effects (GINDX)  
Independent variable Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values Coeff. P-values 
 Islamic values disclosure index: 
   IVDI 0.152 (.014)** 0.120 (.025)** 0.210 (.000)*** 0.235 (.000)*** 
Control variables: Ownership structure variables: 
   BLON -0.075 (.096)* -0.019 (.643) -0.089 (.070)* -0.098 (.065)* 
   GVTR 0.126 (.034)**  0.138 (.027)** 0.153 (.000)*** 0.162 (.000)*** 
   INON 0.008 (.685) 0.079 (.060)* 0.125 (.033)** 0.134 (.029)** 
Control variables: Corporate governance variables: 
   BODZ 0.102 (.058)* 0.040 (.154) 0.136 (.000)*** 0.145 (.000)*** 
   AUFZ 0.130 (.020)** 0.085 (.067)* 0.210 (.000) *** 0.228 (.000)*** 
   CORG 0.137 (.000)*** 0.111 (.029)** 0.189 (.000)*** 0.195 (.000)*** 
Control variables: Firm-level characteristics 
   CEXP -0.005 (.795) -0.002 (.823) -0.026 (.587) -0.103 (.080)* 
   DVPS 0.138 (.000)*** 0.140 (.000)*** 0.210 (.000)*** 0.208 (.000)*** 
   FIMZ 0.186 (.000)*** 0.194 (.000)*** 0.253 (.000)*** 0.265 (.000)*** 
   BETA -0.079 (.072)* -0.080 (.065)* -0.124 (.000)*** -0.130 (.000)*** 
   LEVG 0.139 (.000)*** 0.134 (.000)*** 0.153 (.000)*** 0.164 (.000)*** 
   PROF -0.002 (.872) -0.008 (.814) -0.011 (.780) -0.009 (.810) 
   SAGR -0.004 (.853) -0.006 (.792) -0.009 (.765) -0.011 (.744) 
   Industry dummies  Included  Included  Included Included 
   Year dummies  Included  Included  Included Included 
   Firm dummies Excluded Excluded Excluded Included 
Constant -0.643 (.000)*** -0.685 (.000)*** -0.876 (.000)*** -0.930 (.000)*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 1.694 1.713 1.890 1.965 
F- value      8.340***   8.657***   14.749***  18.410*** 
Adjusted R2 0.362 0.390 0.576 0.689 
No. of observations    150    375    525   525 
Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust Clustered Standard Errors technique. ***, **, and * 
denote significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: Saudi corporate governance disclosure index (GINDX): Pre-2006 
GINDX and Post-2006 GINDX and Weighted-GINDX; Fixed-effects model; Islamic values disclosure index (IVDI); block ownership (BLON); government ownership 
(GVTR); institutional ownership (INON); board size (BODZ); audit firm size (AUFZ); presence of a corporate governance committee (CORG); capital expenditure 
(CEXP); dividend payment status (DVPS); firm size (FIMZ); risk (BETA); leverage (LEVG); return on assets (PROF); and sales growth (SAGR). Table I fully defines 
all the variables used. 
 
